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BIOMETRIC CAPTURE: DISRUPTING THE DIGITAL CODIFICATION 
OF BLACK MIGRANTS IN THE UK 
 
Abstract 
The current system of the surveillance of migrants relies on biometric capture. To be 
captured is to be codified into machine-readable representations. This paper merges 
technological codifications with political discourse to explore the disproportionate capturing 
of black migrants in the UK. Using the historical treatment of Nigerian migrants in the UK as 
an illustration, this paper interrogates how contemporary technologies are used to codify and 
confine black migrants. This paper explores works from digital artists — Keith Piper and Joy 
Buolamwini — to address this codification of blackness using biometric technology. It calls 
for new technological cultures of coding that centre the disruption of violent systems of 
capture. Failure is defined as this disruption of hegemonic systems of codification and 
capture that aim to subjugate black communities. This paper stresses that it is only when 
technologies of capture fail that black and migrant communities can truly experience digital 
freedom. 
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As though I was living in a farcical dystopic film about bureaucracy created by the 
Nollywood filmmaker Kunle Afolayan, I walk into the high-ceiling lobby of the Nigerian 
High Commission in London in the hopes of renewing my passport. I walk up a crowded 
hallway, into a room packed with people. I present my documents at several checkpoints, 
after which my ticket number is called to move upstairs to the waiting room. Upstairs, along 
a five-foot-wide corridor stood two rooms next to each other—the biometric waiting room 
and the biometric capture room. I move into the former, where passport applicants watch the 
news from the Nigerian Television Authority. The people in this room occupy themselves 
while waiting for their biological data to be captured and stored in their biometric passports. 
As one of the largest gatherings of black people I have ever seen in the setting of data 
capture, this moment underscores the legacy of colonial power as an imposition of systems of 
capture. Illustrating the legacy of colonial imposition is the British colonial government’s 
role in producing the first instance of the Nigerian passport in 1948 (Ogbu 2015). The 
colonial administration called this document the British West African passport, signifying 
that Nigerians were British citizens located in West Africa. The British West African 
passport required the capturing of Nigerians data—name, gender, age and so on. This paper 
will expand on the colonial imposition and capture, linking it to the present-day process of 
biometric capture. Particularly, it focuses on the British colonial capture of Nigerians and the 
implications of this legacy in the codification and biometric capture of Nigerians in the UK.  
As Nigerians make up the largest number of Black Africans who then make up the 
major pool of black people in the UK (Government Digital Services 2018), the treatment of 
Nigerians becomes symbolic of the treatment of black populations in the UK. Therefore, the 
digital capture of Nigerians is symbolic of the digital capture of black communities in the 
UK. From the categorization of Nigerians as illegitimate migrants with the UK’s 1960s 
immigration laws to their numbers as one of the most prominent populations of black 
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migrants, Nigerian migrants have a complicated history with the UK. The complicated 
history merges with contemporary issues especially when taking in the global trope of the 
Nigerian internet fraud prevalent since the late 1990s (Kperogi and Duhé 2008). Such issues 
coalesce to tag Nigerians as criminals in the UK. A cursory search for the word ‘Nigerian 
migrant’ in British tabloid newspapers such as The Daily Mail will lead to stories of sham 
marriages (Williams 2016; Andrews 2019), credit card scams (Robertson 2018), and benefits 
fraud (Duell 2016). Thus, the Nigerian fraudster merges with British tensions about 
immigration to criminalize the Nigerian diaspora in the UK. 
Solutions to the problem of the ‘Nigerian migrant’ take the form of biometric 
identification. The Nigerian government attempts to deal with the problem of falsifying 
documents and identity fraud through enforcing securitized e-passports and biometric 
identification campaigns (Jackson 2015). Introduced in July 2007, the current version of the 
Nigerian passport is called the ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) 
Harmonized Electronic Smart Passport. ECOWAS is a regional economic union of 15 West 
African states1 that seek to encourage economic prosperity across the member states after 
their independence from colonial rule (Adepoju, Boulton, and Levin 2010). Established in 
Lagos, Nigeria on May 28, 1975, one of the longstanding goals of ECOWAS is freedom of 
movement across the region. ECOWAS encapsulated this goal in the 1979 Protocol Relating 
to Free Movement of Persons, Residence and Establishment (Adepoju et al. 2010). The 
project to create a single harmonized passport to aide intra-regional movement, was 
initialized in 2000. As Omeje (2017) reports, it was the persuasion of the seating Nigerian 
President, Olusegun Obasanjo—not necessarily pressure from ECOWAS’s international 
 
1 Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-
Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. 
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sponsors such as the European Union—that lead to the adoption of securitized document as 
the official ECOWAS passport in 2007. Bolstering Nigeria’s national interest in managing 
identity within and across its borders, the document incorporates captured facial and 
fingerprint data stored in a chip, to accept the “body as a password” (Lyon 2009: 113). It 
follows the global standard of securitization through biometrics, as unique identity markers 
such as iris patterns and facial landmarks are difficult to falsify. Used as the standard for 
identity verification at most borders, biometrics are “represented as infallible and 
unchallengeable verifiers of the truth about a person” (Amoore 2006: 343). Statistics such as 
the one in 64 billion chance of two fingerprints matching (Cole 2002) are the basis on which 
governments and private firms argue for the reliability and objectivity of biometric 
identification. 
Placed in networked databases shared amongst international organizations, airports 
and countries, biometric data links the body to a digital identity, ensuring that no matter 
where they are located migrants are always bound in digital captivity to the border. The 
biometric or digital capture of migrants makes freedom from the border impossible. It is the 
impossibility of escape that differentiates biometric capture from earlier methods of 
identification. Furthermore, the impossibility of escape asserts colonial dominance over 
Nigerian migrant’s digital life, as the legacies of capture are further embedded into their 
everyday activities as they confirm their identities with biometric documents at banks, 
schools, and hospitals. Therefore, in this article, I argue for freedom from the colonial 
imposition of capture. I call for resistance and the creation of possibilities of escape from 
digital captivity. I center the artistic responses to capturing of black populations as such 
examples of resistance by focusing on two works from black digital practitioners. The works 
in focus are Tagging the Other by Keith Piper (1992) and The Coded Gaze: Unmasking 
Algorithmic Bias by Joy Buolamwini (2016). 
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This paper has a few limitations. By focusing on art practices, this paper forgoes the 
opportunity to conduct a qualitative or quantitative study of the everyday migration tactics of 
black migrants in order to empirically understand the policing of the UK or EU border in 
relation to race. It is beyond the scope of this paper to conduct an empirical study of the 
migration patterns of black migrants or Nigerians in the UK. Also, the choice of Piper’s and 
Buolamwini’s artworks makes my arguments on race and biometrics easily falsifiable. 
However, as I iterate in the following sections, this paper is not concerned with the 
counterargument of racial neutrality in biometric technology or migration as these arguments 
are commonplace (Amoore 2006; Magnet 2011). In focusing on art practices that support my 
arguments of racial bias in biometrics I aim to add to the growing body of scholars, such as 
Browne (2015) and Magnet (2011), that aim to disrupt the commonplace understanding of 
the objectivity of biometric technology. Furthermore, this paper is grounded in acts of 
cultural production, as Browne (2015: p.8) notes that “with certain acts of cultural production 
we can find performances of freedom and suggestions of alternative ways of living under a 
routinized surveillance.” This paper is chiefly interested in the performances of freedom and 
alternatives to regimes of surveillance that can be created only through art practice. Another 
limitation of this paper is in the cyclical argument of biometrics and colonization. This 
cyclical argument is unavoidable as it represents the cyclical nature of the colonial power of 
biometrics. On the one hand, early biometric technologies were developed in contexts of 
colonial administration. Characterizing the development of biometrics in colonial contexts, is 
the 1858 collection of the palm print of a road contractor, Rajyadhar Kōnāi, by the British 
magistrate, William Herschel in colonial India (Herschel 1916). The use of palm prints for 
identification is one of the earliest developments of biometrics. On the other hand, given the 
impositions that must be made for modern applications of biometrics, scholars—most 
notably, Agre (1995)—see biometrics as a metaphor for colonization. Thus, a cyclical pattern 
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emerges where biometric capture resembles colonization and colonial regimes impose 
biometric capture. As I have stated, this cyclical argument, is unavoidable when addressing 
modern biometrics and colonial power. 
The first section of this article expands on the analysis of digital biometric capture 
that addresses its colonial nature. I focus on Agre’s (1994) notion of capture as it stresses the 
impositions—the rearrangement of life—that must be made for computational capture. Agre 
(1995) calls such impositions a metaphor for colonization. However, I argue that when 
looking at the capture of Nigerian migrants, such impositions move from mere metaphor to 
tangible acts of colonialization. I extend my argument by examining the history of Nigerian 
migrants in the UK. This history illustrates the tangible colonial impositions made to capture 
black and Nigerian migrants in the UK. Central to these impositions is the codification—the 
writing into law—of the black or Nigerian migrant as criminal others. In the second and third 
section, I delve deeper into the computational codification of blackness using the artistic 
works of Keith Piper and Joy Buolamwini to illustrate and challenge the process of tagging 
blackness. Building on these works, I focus on two ways contemporary biometric 
technologies codify blackness. Firstly, I explore the tagging of blackness through the 
deployment of biometric technologies with the explicit aim of policing criminalized black 
communities. Secondly, I interrogate the ways these technologies tag blackness with failure. I 
develop on Browne’s (2010) digital epidermalization to address the tagging of blackness in 
the moments when biometric technologies fail to properly register or recognize racialized 
others. Instead of arguing that biometric technologies should be mended to properly identify 
or police black people, I argue for the failure of these machines. In this sense, I call back to 
the colonial legacy of biometric capture. I emphasise that when biometrics work as originally 
intended, they are the tools of surveillance that restrict black migrant mobility and reinforce 
the colonial codification of black people as criminals. In addition, as biometrics are 
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increasingly used to enforce hostile immigration policies and captivate migrants to the 
border, I do not suggest ways this system can work. Instead, I explore failure as a possibility 
of freedom from the hostile biometric environment. 
I embrace failure as resistance to capture. The fourth section of the chapter develops 
on the notion of failure borrowing from Glissant (1997) and Halberstam (2011) to argue for a 
new system of codification—a new defiant language—that evades digital capture and aids 
black migrant freedom. I call such languages ‘computational creole,’ as they appropriate 
machinic errors into modes of resistance. They become ways through which the legacy of 
racism and colonization that have been written into biometric capture can be challenged. It is 
through the new language of computational creole that I position freedom for black 
migrants—thus disrupting the legacy of the codification and capture of black migrants in the 
UK. 
 
Colonial Capture: Contextualizing the Surveillance of Black Migrants in the UK 
Data capture is the new paradigm for privacy in the era of biometric identification. I 
use the word privacy instead of security, as van der Ploeg (2003) notes that government 
agencies position biometrics as a humane contrast to earlier processes of documentation. 
Such methods stored information in verbose human-readable form that could be assessed by 
unauthorised parties to identify a person. Complemented by cryptographic processes that 
obscure and anonymize data, biometrics are constructed as a definitive tool for enhancing the 
privacy of migrants in as much as it is understood as the new standard of security at the 
border. The use of the word ‘privacy’ also refers to Agre’s (1994) cultural model of privacy 
in which he compares surveillance to capture. This model differentiates common 
understandings of privacy from the new computerized models.  For Agre, people commonly 
think of privacy in terms of surveillance. In this mode, private life is invaded by a powerful 
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watcher. Surveillance is connected to visual metaphors communicated by popular statements 
such as ‘Big Brother is watching.’ It more invasive and obnoxious than the new model of 
privacy brought in computational processes. Such modes linguistically parse human activities 
from data. They rely on computational capture and interpretation of said activities. 
While Agre’s differentiation of the visuality of surveillance from the linguistic 
nature of capture is valid, this paper defines surveillance as “the focused, systematic and 
routine attention to personal details for purposes of influence, management, protection or 
direction” (Lyon 2007: 14). This definition encompasses all forms of surveillance— 
biometric surveillance, DNA testing, GPS tracking, wiretapping, dataveillance, and so on— 
which in turn includes computational capture. With that being said, the computational model 
of privacy or data capture, highlights the contemporary practices of surveillance. No longer 
do subjects have to be watched, instead their behaviours and attributes are parsed in a 
linguistic system that translates every portion of their being to machine-readable artefacts. 
The collection of these artefacts relies on ‘grammars’ that consist of a thorough 
deconstruction of an activity or object into its unique features, which are then arranged into a 
set of rules that a given computer can replicate, interpret or recognize. For instance, facial 
recognition consists of the deconstruction of a given face into the unique features that mark 
its structure. These features are then stored as a template and compared to a presented face to 
link the data to its originator (Gates 2011). Different systems resort to various methods to 
read and recognize the face for biometric identification. However, the grammar stays the 
same—present a face, document its unique landmarks, store the landmarks as a template and 
match a presented face to the stored template.  
Agre (1994) describes capture as a metaphor for colonization, maintaining that 
computerized capture requires a “reorganization of communities’ systems of meaning so that 
existing concepts are given technical definitions and thus subordinated to a technological 
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order of knowledge and power” (Agre 1995: 180). While Agre’s conceptualization of capture 
as a metaphor for colonization is vital, it is important to note the tangible acts of colonial 
racism embedded in the contemporary applications of digital capture. Colonization, as the 
scholar Cesaire (2000: 42) states, is a system of “domination and submission which turn[s] 
the coloniz[er] into a class-room monitor, an army sergeant, a prison guard, a slave driver, 
and the indigenous man into an instrument of production.” As a system of domination and 
submission, colonization always involves the imposition of the codes of the monitor, guard, 
and so on into indigenous cultures. This imposition is a form of capture as conceptualized by 
Deleuze and Guattari (1989). For the theorists, capture is the act of reducing indigenous 
cultures and property into a system of codes understood by the ruler. Indigenous land is 
codified as rent; activity as labour and profit; and nature as raw material. Everything that 
meets the gaze of the imperial state can be codified and, therefore, captured.  
Scott (1998) outlines in the book Seeing Like a State several processes of colonial 
capture, ranging from the creation of permanent last names for indigenous people to the 
standardization of farming methods. Taking the illustrations Scott gives, to be captured in 
colonial terms is have one’s identity dictated as some state-sanctioned code and represented 
by a number that is issued in identity cards, birth certificates, driver’s licenses, and passports. 
In that vein, the British West African passport was a method of capturing Nigerians under 
imperial dominion. Before the capturing into identification document came the colonial 
assignment of permanent surnames to the indigenous people. As Deleuze and Guattari (1989: 
448) explicate, “there is lawful violence wherever violence contributes to the creation of that 
which it is used against, [… or] wherever capture contributes to the creation of that which it 
captures.” Further expressing exposing this violence, the scholars highlight the technological 
nature of capture, calling it a system of “machinic enslavement” (Deleuze and Guattari 1989: 
460). The colonizer invents technologies that enforces its system of codes and entraps people 
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to the said system. These aspects of colonial capture are evident when looking into the 
history of the Nigerian passport. 
Under the British Nationality Act of 1948, citizens of the Commonwealth could 
freely travel to and live in the UK and its colonies using their British colonial passports 
(Solomos 1988). Until Nigeria gained independence in 1960, the British West African 
passport was the primary identification paper needed for a Nigerian to travel to the UK. 
Nigerians migrating into the UK would join the 1950s post-war Black Caribbean migrants 
called the Windrush generation, changing the cultural makeup of the UK (Solomos 1988). 
The change in racial and cultural makeup incited anxieties. Thus, the problems of housing, 
employment, and crime were laid on the shoulders of black migrants. 
Responding to these problems, the British parliament placed several restrictions and 
checks to reduce immigration from its former South Asian and African colonies. These 
restrictions were stipulated by the Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1962 and the 
Immigration Act of 1971 (Solomos 1988). The laws withdrew the right to freely migrate to 
the UK from former African and South Asian colonies. However, these rights were retained 
for former white-majority colonies and Commonwealth nations such as Canada, Australia, 
and New Zealand. As Solomos (1988) states, these policies were thinly veiled exertions of 
white British nationalism. In particular, the restrictions enacted were strict visa requirements 
placed on migrants from India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Ghana, and Nigeria in 1986. As seen in 
the transcript of Parliamentary debates, nationals from these former British colonies would 
undergo more rigorous checks entering the UK (House of Commons Debate 21st October 
1986). As part of the increased scrutinization, they would be required to secure a UK visa 
before travelling or face refusal at the border. Arguing for the visa requirements, the 1986 
Minister of Home Affairs, Malcolm Sinclair (HC Deb. 21st October 1986) stated citizens 
from India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Ghana, and Nigeria made up 49 percent of entry refusals in 
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1985 and 53 percent in 1986. While the minister noted the generally increasing number of 
migrations into the UK and the resulting pressures the upsurge placed on border staff, he 
singled out these countries while stressing the protection of ‘bona fide’ visitors. Closely 
reading Sinclair’s statement, migrants from India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Ghana, and Nigeria 
were to be written in legislature as illegitimate visitors with the proposed visa restrictions. 
 After the successful implementation of the visa requirements argued by Minister 
Sinclair and his party in 1986, citizens of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Ghana, and Nigeria 
faced a further increased rate of refusal to enter the UK (Great Britain Home Office 1987). 
These visa restrictions on African and South Asian migrants show some of the first instances 
of the codification of travellers of colour as illegitimate migrants, criminals or security 
threats. As Dean (1986) reports, the statistics did not match the reason for the increased 
controls. On the one hand, ministers argued that the visa restrictions were necessary to reduce 
illegal migration, which they had linked to the five countries. On the other hand, statistics 
showed that out of the 452,000 migrants from these countries, only 222 fled into hiding as 
undocumented migrants. In addition, as Lord Eric Lubbock—from the opposition party—
highlighted, the statistics the Minister Sinclair stated about the 53 percent rate of refusals of 
the five countries could be interpreted differently (HC Deb. 21st October 1986). It could have 
been interpreted as pre-existing higher level of scrutinization of these nationals. It could also 
have been interpreted as the result of the border agents’ disproportionate suspicion of the 
members of the five countries that resulted in their disproportionate refusal from entry. 
Furthermore, Dean reports that before the restrictions on the five countries, only communist 
nations were required to provide visas on entry. Thus, this era began the long history of 
codification of the black migrant as a criminal.  
Surveillance of this ‘criminal’ at the border occurred through stringent immigration 
checks and disproportionate scrutiny. Within the UK, these black migrant communities were 
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monitored by abusing the ‘stop and search’ powers of the police first written in the Vagrancy 
Act of 1824, also known as the ‘sus laws’ (Hall et al. 1978). The successor to this legislation 
is the Police and Criminal Evidence Act of 1984 (PACE). This law was used as the basis for 
the disproportionate surveillance of black youth in the UK (Hall et al. 1978). It led to the 
antagonism between the police and the black community, which will be addressed later in the 
next section. PACE is currently used as a validation for the stop and search of black people in 
the UK. As the Equality and Human Rights Commission (2010: 10) state, “if you are black, 
you are at least six times as likely to be stopped and searched by the police in England and 
Wales as a white person.” In 2018 this number increased to 9.5 (Government Digital Services 
2019).  
While other western countries such as the US (New York Civil Liberties Union 
2012) and Canada (Wortley and Owusu-Bempah 2011) show the same pattern of a higher 
rate of stop and search for black people, the UK is unique due to the colonial legacy of the 
codification and resultant surveillance of black migrants. Although stop and search has a 
longer legacy than biometrics, the surveillance of black populations is increasingly a question 
of digital capture. Scholars such as van der Ploeg (2003) have questioned the violation of 
bodily integrity in biometrics that bears similarity to violation of a stop and search. As the 
body does not need to be physically present or consent when its data is digitally scrutinized, 
biometric technologies abuse bodily integrity with less resistance than a stop and search. The 
ability to inspect a body in its absence harkens back to Cesaire’s (2000: 42) definition of 
colonization as a system of “domination and submission.”  The body turned to biometric data 
is dominated and appropriated for the purposes of the proprietor of the database. Therefore, if 
capture is a linguistic system involving computational grammars that reorganize life, as Agre 
(1994) notes, these grammars are informed by colonial impositions of power. These 
grammars also involve what Hall (1995: 21) calls a “grammar of race”—codes and symbols 
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that define race. Such grammars of race, as it pertains to blackness, represent blackness in 
codes. For instance, as Hall (1995) notes, the grammars of race in film codifies black people 
as lazy or subservient through their representation as sambos or mammies. The following two 
sections address the codification and representation of blackness in and through digital 
capture. To address such codifications, I first discuss the grammar of race within the 
deployment of surveillance technology. Keith Piper’s 1992 work of art, Surveillance: 
Tagging the Other centres this exploration of the codification of blackness using technology. 
In the subsequent section, I look to Joy Buolamwini’s The Coded Gaze to examine the 
codification of blackness through the biometric failure to recognize faces with dark skin 
tones. 
 
Tagging the Other: On Technology and the Codification of Black Migrants in the UK 
“It is a serious problem. There are about a thousand applications being made in a 
week. How many of those bogus? I don’t know. But it is thought that a great majority of 
them are bogus,” says one of the many voices layered into the discordant soundscape in 
Tagging the Other2 (Piper 1992: no pagination). This four-panel video installation has a 
soundscape that loops personal accounts, news broadcasts, and political speeches. These play 
over a cacophony of police sirens and beatboxing, all of which join to create an atmosphere 
that evokes the social anxieties surrounding migrants of colour in the UK. These anxieties 
include, on the one hand, the state imperative to capture the “truth” (Amoore 2006, Magnet 
2011) of identity, and on the other, the desire of communities under surveillance to live in 
peace. As though they are in a grand national conversation, voices immediately follow each 
other. The voices are those of black migrants who give their experiences of racial 
 
2 See video excerpts of Tagging the Other in the link provided in the bibliography. 
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discrimination and anti-immigrant sentiment in the UK. A person explains that due to their 
race, it would be difficult for the border agent to tell if they were a British citizen from the 
Caribbean or a West African migrant worker. Their identity card would be the only proof that 
they have the right to reside in the UK. Therefore, the responsibility is on them whether the 
border officer refuses them or lets them in. Here, Piper shows the construction of black 
citizens in the UK as perpetual diaspora, constantly belonging elsewhere even when they 
might have lived their entire lives in Britain. Another migrant underscores this dilemma of 
belonging decrying that the mixed messages of assimilation and negation of migrant 
identities have left them confused about their relationship to the UK.  
 
Figure 1. Still frames of the four video panels of Tagging the Other. Video by Keith Piper 
(1992). Courtesy of the artist. 
 
All four video panels (fig. 1) have an animated bust of a black man placed alongside 
texts and images. The bust rotates in a manner that simulates a 3-dimensional scan. 
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Differentiating these four panels, are the objects and texts that track the movement of the 
man’s face. In the first panel, instead of boxes tracking his face, a concentric circle 
resembling a sniper’s target traces his movement. The panel is titled “visible differences.” In 
the second pane, the circle that encloses the man’s face changes to an open bracket 
accompanied by a blue bar that covers his eyes. The title of the x-axis is “culture,” and 
“ethnicity” is on the y-axis. The man’s head is outlined by a 3-dimensional box in the third 
panel. On the two top axes are “subject” and “object.” “Reject” rests underneath. The blue 
bar moves from his eyes to his mouth. In the final panel, the bracket returns, enveloping the 
man’s head. Within this bracket is a rotating locus, and outside of this locus is the text 
“otherness” and the word “boundaries.”  
Created in the early 1990s, the digital interface in this work bears similarities to 
technologies of facial capture (Piper 1992). Boxes and circles that track the face are the 
common design choice in contemporary facial detection. However, in Tagging the Other, the 
text and boxes of the digital interface become ways of communicating the codification of the 
scrutinized black person. Connecting this technological language to the national discourses 
and personal accounts of black communities in the UK, Piper illustrates the connection of 
social tagging (through the news and politics) to the technological tagging or surveillance of 
black people in the UK. Piper places this critique of technological surveillance and social 
tagging in the background text behind the rotating bust in the Subject/Object/Reject panel. 
The text reads: “FIXING THE BOUNDARIES OF A NEW EUROPE... TAGGING THE 
OTHER… PERFECTING NEW TECHNOLOGIES OF SURVEILLANCE… POLICING, 
INTERNATIONAL COLONIES OF DIFFERENCE… REINFORCING THE FORTRESS.” 
Therefore, sacrificed within the process of the initiation of a unified European 
market, are those othered in the dialogue surrounding this national transformation. Akin to 
the 1960s increases in migration control for black migrants (Solomos 1988), the British 
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tensions about the movement of the African diaspora at this defining moment is quelled by 
the increased capturing of these groups of people. This sacrifice culminates in technological 
development and the reinforcement of national borders. As with the events of the 1970s and 
1980s, whenever British identity seems most tenuous, race is often brought into the centre of 
the debate. Mercer quotes Stuart Hall in the anthology of Piper’s work “Blacks become the 
bearer, the signifiers of crisis of British society [… Race] is the framework through which the 
crisis is experienced. It is the means by which the crisis is to be resolved— “send them 
away”” (cited in Mercer 1997: 41). Within the current era of digital surveillance, the black 
community is the signifier of crisis in British society. Governmental organizations battle to 
control this community through technological means, thereby “perfecting new modes of 
technological surveillance” (Piper 1992: no pagination). Deployment and experimentations of 
surveillance technology in these communities highlight the perfection of computational 
capture in the process of tagging the black other.  
The 2016 Notting Hill Carnival demonstrates the ways technologies continue 
colonial legacies of capture. In 2016, the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) tested out real-
time facial recognition in the Notting Hill Carnival (Randhawa and Crerar 2016). This 
festival is thrown in the celebration of the African and Caribbean community in the UK. MPS 
took this gathering as an opportunity to test biometric surveillance, complementing it with 
‘super-recognizer’ officers who are trained to spot wanted criminals. As Randhawa and 
Crerar (2016) report, the database they used to train the facial recognition software consisted 
of images of people who had been banned from the carnival and those who had arrest 
warrants out for them. After this first attempt, the MPS returned in 2017 with a scaled-up 
arrangement. They used a wider database containing twenty million facial images from 
people who had been in police custody (Wiles 2017). As Martin (2017) reports, MPS’ facial 
recognition program matched 35 people to the wrong facial template. In one case, the match 
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led to an arrest of an innocent person. The 2016 and 2017 deployment of ‘super-recognizers’ 
and facial recognition to police and monitor black migrants did not appear out of nowhere. 
The MPS’ contemporary surveillance experiment calls back to the over 40-year-old tension 
between the police and the black community in the UK. This tension is also encapsulated in 
the 1976 Notting Hill Riot. 
As Gilroy (1987: 93) writes, the 1976 Notting Hill Carnival riot was “a watershed in 
the history of conflict between blacks and the police and in the growth of the authoritarian 
forms of state planning and intervention.” This moment marked the beginnings of the tagging 
of black youths as criminals. It was within this same grammar of race via colonial conquest 
and Western imperialism that the black immigrant was tagged as a high-security threat at the 
UK border. The relationship between the independence of the former British colonies, the 
post-war immigration from Commonwealth nations, and the rise in British racism in the 
1960s and 1970s cannot be overstated. As stated earlier, as of 2018, a black person is 9.5 
times more likely to be stopped and searched by the police than a white person in the UK 
(Government Digital Services 2019). This disproportionate suspicion and monitoring of black 
people takes its roots in the historic moments of colonization, migration, and British racism. 
They highlight that blackness was surveilled both at the border and within the residences of 
the UK. Therefore, the contemporary capture of black populations within the UK cannot and 
should not be separated from colonial practices tagging and codification of indigenous 
identities. 
Best characterizing this period of the discursive and textual tagging of blackness is 
the British nationalist, Enoch Powell’s, labelling of mugging as a black crime. As Hall et al. 
(1978) note, mugging only came into the British vocabulary within the early 1970s. Piper 
indicates this in the fourth panel of Tagging the Other — “naming the problem” (Piper 1992). 
Naming problems here is also comparable to the 1980s classification of black migrants as 
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high-risk or illegal. This practice of racially naming several aspects of criminality ultimately 
led to state violence, wherein 1500 police officers were deployed into the 1976 carnival. MPS 
reports, according to Gilroy (1987), stated that the cause of this riot was an act of black 
solidarity in which the crowd came to the defence of some black ‘criminals’ being arrested. 
Almost 40 years later, this tradition of the surveillance and violent policing continues as the 
police continuously escalate their efforts to control crime within the Notting Hill Carnival. 
Most telling of this tradition is the criticized row of arrests—656 in total—in the weeks 
leading up to the 2017 Notting Hill Carnival (Grierson and Gayle 2017). Facial recognition as 
a form of the MPS’ colonial state capture, applies this historical grammar of race in the UK. 
The deployment of this technology in Notting Hill signifies the continued efforts in the 
criminalization of African and Caribbean communities now written into technologies of 
surveillance. 
As introduced earlier, the ECOWAS biometric passport is one of the identification 
technologies used to codify and police the criminal Nigerian migrant. Such documents 
connect bodies to digital identities stored on several networked databases. Amoore (2006) 
terms the network of biometric databases the ‘biometric border’—a system of digitized 
bodies and national frontiers that ensure that migrants are always linked to the border. Hence, 
the impossibility of escape is what separates the biometric border from earlier technologies of 
capture used in border policing. While these earlier systems relied on identification through 
photographs, signatures, and physical fingerprints that would be interpreted by humans, the 
networked biometric border relies on the power of computation. This is the power to capture 
and recognize several biometric traits in a fraction of the time it would take a human. It is the 
power, as stated earlier, to inspect a body even when it is not present. Therefore, the 
biometric border creates an inescapable fortress of digital captivity or “machinic 
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enslavement” (Deleuze and Guattari 1989: 460). When used in strict immigration regimes, 
biometric borders become violent enforcers of national boundaries.  
An example of the violent regime of biometric border surveillance is the ‘hostile 
environment’ towards illegal immigration championed by the former UK Home Secretary, 
Theresa May (Kirkup and Winnet 2012). In the UK, biometrics enforce the general hostility 
towards migration with no consideration for legality. The government deputizes healthcare 
staff, school administrators, landlords, and bank clerks as border agents. These private 
citizens would be required to confirm and report the immigration status of those they 
encounter, denying services where necessary. Biometric documents such as e-passports, 
visas, and residence permit cards are the primary tools for enforcing these checks. Through 
the hostile biometric environment in the UK, the border is virtualized and connected to the 
bodies of migrants. Consequently, these migrants are constantly surveilled and confined in 
digital captivity.  
It was due to these strict rules on migration and documentation that several people of 
African and Caribbean descent who arrived in the post-war era using their colonial and 
Commonwealth passports were denied access to employment, healthcare, benefits, and entry 
into the UK (Gentleman 2018). These people of Caribbean descent are called the Windrush 
generation after the vessel, the Empire Windrush that famously carried Jamaicans into UK in 
1948 (Fryer 2010). The Windrush generation were invited and recruited from their home 
countries to lessen the labour scarcity the UK faced after WWII. From the 1950s to 1970s, 
before the passing of the anti-immigration laws in the UK, people from the Caribbean 
travelled to the UK to take on jobs as nurses, railway and public transport workers. They did 
not only help rebuild the country after the war, but due to their position as colonial subjects, 
they were British citizens. As Fryer (2010) notes they considered themselves English. The 
Windrush generation had British passports. They did not require any further documentation 
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to settle in the UK. However, within the current hostile biometric environment, this 
generation now required British passports or migrant resident permits to access essential 
things such as housing, healthcare and disability benefits. In addition, numerous members of 
the Windrush generation and their families faced deportations and refusals from the UK 
Border. The issue gained prominence with increased media coverage in 2018, as stories of 
the elderly generation being denied healthcare and access to benefits met the public eye. It 
rose to the level of national scandal ensuing parliamentary debates.  
The ‘Windrush Scandal,’ as the event was called, stresses the criticality of biometric 
documentation for migrants as it is a necessity for their survival. Such imperatives of 
documentation—biometric or otherwise—must therefore be problematized. Human survival 
should not depend on documents. Nonetheless, the current immigration system functions in 
this way. The migration system as it stands in the UK continues the project of colonial 
surveillance outlined above. Instead of redesigning the system, it uses biometric technology 
to enforce the colonial codification of black migrants from the earliest days of contemporary 
British migration. Instead of revolutionizing the process of immigration, these technologies 
exclude and confine black migrants. Therefore, this article does not attempt to justify or 
support this system. It does not propose humane forms of biometric surveillance or 
documentation as it understands that these systems as the violent apparatus of colonial 
capture. Instead, I focus on failure, considering the potential for freedom from surveillance 
within the moments when these technologies malfunction.  
 
Understanding Biometric Failure: The Codification of Race in Digital Technology 
Even when they fail, they succeed Magnet (2011: 3) states on biometric 
technologies. Martin (2017) reports this sentiment echoed in the MPS’ reaction to the false 
matches and erroneous arrest in the 2017 facial recognition pilot. While activist groups and 
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people of colour declared the technology faulty at best—and racist at worst—MPS stated that 
it was a success (Martin 2017). The impossibility of biometric failure, according to Magnet, 
thus lies in the discourses surrounding it. Within the context of the colonial police state, 
biometrics can only fail when they negate the purpose of domination and control—when they 
hinder surveillance. Therefore, the definition of biometric failure within this paper is the 
disruption of colonial capture. This section looks at the computational codification of 
blackness to address and expand on biometric failure. 
In the technical sense, failure in biometric systems has separate categories. These 
categories are false match, false non-match, and failure to enrol (Nanavati, Thieme, and 
Nanavati, 2002). False matches occur when the system accepts data different from biometric 
template given at the initial moment of data capture. An example of this is the incorrect 
acceptance of the user’s identical twin or doppelgänger in a facial recognition system. False 
non-matches are the opposite of the false match. They occur when the correct information is 
rejected. Failure to enrol (FTE) is the inability of the biometric system to capture the data of a 
given subject. FTE can occur for several reasons. It can be due to environmental issues such 
as a poorly lit face, faults in the hardware or software, or demographic failure. “Demographic 
failures” (Magnet, 2011, p.5) are of particular interest in this paper as these are the cases in 
which biometrics fail due to age, gender, race, or ability. Magnet (2011), typifies several 
instances of such failures in the issues Asian women experience with fingerprint scanners to 
those people with dark skin-tones experience with facial recognition technology. The MIT 
researcher and activist, Joy Buolamwini (2016) documents her experience of the latter form 
of demographic failure in The Coded Gaze.  
Buolamwini created The Coded Gaze in response to her experience making her 
previous project called The Aspire Mirror—a device that uses facial recognition and image 
overlays to enable “you to look at yourself and see a reflection on your face based on what 
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inspires you or what you hope to empathize with” (Buolamwini 2015). When testing the 
mirror, she discovered that the software would not recognize her face. She resorted to 
wearing a generic white mask to test-run the project. In The Coded Gaze (Buolamwini 2016), 
she questions the bias facial recognition algorithms have against dark-skinned people. Here, 
she demands algorithmic justice through the representation of diversity in the production of 
these technologies. The Coded Gaze illustrates the representational nature of digital capture, 
as Buolamwini pinpoints the lack of black and brown faces in the dataset of facial references. 
The researcher calls for a remedy of this problem, arguing for the inclusion of a diverse set of 
coders into the creation of these algorithms. The call for diversity and the representation of 
black coders is where Piper’s (1992) criticism of the grammar of race written into technology 
connects with Buolamwini’s work. It is also from this juncture that I develop on the linguistic 
potential of failure to create digital codes that aid black migrant freedom from digital 
captivity. 
In the Tagging the Other panel titled “visible differences,” Piper (1992) places the 
text “the binary code of ethnicity.” By binary, the artist is referring to the dualistic 
categorization of cultural difference. Synchronously, binary code refers to machine code or 
the basic language of all digital systems (Plant 1997). In a sense, ethnicity and difference are 
placed here as a basic digital language. As the binary digits of ones and zeros represent the 
social dichotomies of blacks and white, male and female, legal and illegal, the structural 
language of computation comes to resemble that of racial ordering. Elsewhere, Piper (2015) 
reveals in a work-in-progress, a movement beyond the digital dichotomy of race and its 
implications for computational systems. ‘Cyberebonics,’ Piper terms certain human-readable 
languages that aid communication between human agents and the machine. Cyber, here is 
akin to the digital and Ebonics are languages spoken by black people in the US to 
communicate with other black people. As Piper underscores, Ebonics is encrypted code only 
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interpretable by black people. Piper illustrates this encrypted language by playing an excerpt 
from Gil Scott-Heron’s (1978) ‘The Ghetto Code (Dot Dot Dit Dit Dot Dot Dash),’ where the 
poet speaks in jumbled words used by the black inner-city communities to evade CIA and 
FBI telephone surveillance. In this sense, Ebonics is encrypted verbal code. Cyberebonics is 
therefore the rendition of Ebonics to machine code with the aims of human-computer 
communication. Adobe Director’s (formerly Macromedia Director) Lingo is an example of 
Cyberebonics for Piper. A scripting language created by the Hackney-born, Brooklyn-raised 
inventor of Jamaican descent, John Henry Thompson, Lingo was the primary language artists 
used to make interactive content on CD-ROM. Artists would write Lingo script in the media 
authoring software Director to manipulate, videos, sounds and animations. Lingo was 
verbose in that it had similarities with spoken English. For instance, to move to a video frame 
in Lingo an artist would write: 
go to frame 10 
 
Alternatively, in JavaScript, the scripting language used to manipulate web pages, this line of 
code would be less similar to spoken words and written in succinct words. Given the 
preliminary declarations are made to display a video on the webpage have been made, all the 
programmer needs to write to manipulate the video frame in JavaScript is: 
myVideo.currentTime = 10; 
 
In this sense, Lingo fulfils the aims of Piper’s Cyberebonics as it eases of human-computer 
communication. 
In addition, Lingo, as Piper (2015) notes, shares similarities with languages of the 
black diaspora such as Antillean Creole, African American Ebonics, Caribbean Patois or 
West African Pidgin. The similarity shared with these languages is in the forgoing of strict 
grammatical structures. Lingo eschews the classification of variables into specific data types 
(i.e. integers, strings, Booleans, and so on). Thus, any given variable could take on any data 
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type as a string, integer, symbol or Boolean. As in the shifting “series of forgettings” though 
which Creole language “renews itself” (Glissant 1997: 69), Lingo has a loose grammar in 
which any variable can be converted to any given property or object. This characteristic of 
the scripting language makes “Lingo’s data typing […] loose to the point of being obscene” 
(Epstein 1998: 153). The obscenity of Lingo’s loose type is a metaphor for a movement 
beyond the dichotomy of binary code and strict codifications that support the colonial 
grammars of race. 
Cyberebonics carries more significance when brought into the context of biometrics. 
For Browne (2015), digital biometric technologies, with their descent from branding, execute 
the binary code of ethnicity through “digital epidermalization”—a computational act of 
racialization. Browne (2010: 135) defines digital epidermalization as: 
“the exercise of power cast by the disembodied gaze of certain surveillance 
technologies (for example, identity card and e-passport verification machines) that 
can be employed to do the work of alienating the subject by producing a ‘truth’ about 
the body and one’s identity (or identities) despite the subject’s claims.”  
Browne derives the term epidermalization, from Fanon (2008) who describes the embodied 
experience of racialization with an event that transpired when he was spotted by a child who 
screamed at him, “Look, a Negro!” For Fanon, this moment marked a shift in his identity to 
the “racial epidermal schema,” thus reducing him to the colour of his skin (Fanon 2008: 84).  
Epidermalization or the experience of being reduced to the racial epidermal schema is a 
system of tagging the other that assigns a person to a given race. 
Digital epidermalization is, therefore, a computational procedure that signals “Look, 
a Negro!” In the moment of technological codification, race is created and assigned. A 
moment such as the biometric failure to register dark-skinned people, as exemplified in The 
Coded Gaze, demonstrates the computational assignment of race. When biometric technology 
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fails due to the tone of the user’s skin, it yells, “Look, a Negro!” It thus tags otherness to the 
biometric subject. Digital epidermalization, therefore, relies on colonial codes of racial 
exclusion written into the technological process of capture. Expanding on cyberebonics, I call 
for new languages that appropriate biometric failure and disrupt the digital epidermalization 
of black migrants. In this paper, these new languages are called ‘computational creole,’ 
connecting the indigenous acts of resistance against colonial linguistic systems to the 
resistance against oppressive digital systems. 
 
Figure 2. A screen-grabbed frame from Buolamwini’s YouTube video The Coded Gaze, 
showing her in a white mask. Video by Joy Buolamwini (2016).  
 
Computational Creole: The New Codes of Digital Resistance 
The symbolism in The Coded Gaze (Buolamwini 2016) is what makes it subversive. 
Due to the failure to recognize her face, Buolamwini wears a white mask to test her project 
(fig. 2). In a sense, this can be read as a performance of the title of Fanon’s seminal work 
Black Skin, White Masks adapted for the digital age. Buolamwini’s performance highlights 
the paradox of visibility embodied by black communities in the West. On the one hand, black 
people are hyper-visible, as seen in the prevalence of the imagery of the Nigerian identity 
26 
 
fraud and the black criminal. On the other hand, black people are not represented in the data 
that trains the algorithms due to the lack of diversity in software engineering. As the black 
feminist scholar, Collins (1998: 38) writes, “surveillance seems designed to produce a 
particular effect — Black women remain visible yet silenced; their bodies become written by 
other texts, yet they remain powerless to speak for themselves.” Thus, within the pretext of 
representational politics in biometric industries, Buolamwini’s creation of her utopian 
technology illustrates a much-needed moment of a black woman writing facial recognition 
algorithms. However, given the knowledge of the violent practices of biometric capture and 
the surveillance of African diasporic communities addressed in this article, biometric failure 
creates opportunities for the development of new codes. These codes form new languages of 
resistance against the digital captivity or “machinic enslavement” of Nigerian and black 
migrants (Deleuze and Guattari 1989: 460). 
Failure should not be mistaken for an antagonistic sentiment against Buolamwini’s 
call for representation or support of criminal acts. In fact, biometric failure takes the call for 
representation even further, encouraging black migrants, artists, academics, and engineers to 
create new languages and codes of digital resistance. It calls for languages that fail in the 
ways defined by Halberstam’s framing. Halberstam (2011: 88) frames failure as “a way of 
refusing to acquiesce to dominant logics of power and discipline.” Bringing back Cesaire’s 
(2000) definition of colonization as a system of domination, failure becomes anti-colonial. 
For Halberstam (2011), however, failure is a queer act of resistance that encourages losing 
one’s way, “detouring and getting lost,” and forgetfulness (Halberstam 2011: 24). It is a 
counter-hegemonic technique that supports the acceptance of the limitations of knowledge 
and alternative ways of living.  
Failure is akin to Glissant’s (1997: 20) notion of ‘errantry’ as a rejection of the 
“generalizing edict that summarized the world as something obvious and transparent, 
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claiming for it one presupposed sense and one destiny.” For Glissant, errantry is a refusal of 
colonial knowledge that aims to codify and reduce everything it encounters. Linguistic forms 
such as American Ebonics, Antillean Creole, West African pidgin, and Caribbean Patios 
demonstrate an errantry in language. These languages are formed from acts of resistance 
against colonial power. They mix the words from indigenous and colonial languages, failing 
to abide by the rules or syntax of any given language. In addition, as Piper (2015) notes these 
languages are a form of encryption, as they aid the communication amongst those colonized. 
The failures in grammar and syntax meant that the colonial masters could not decipher the 
communication between the colonized people. It is in the mixture of failure, the disruption of 
the codification of race into technology, and the resistance to colonial capture that this paper 
pushes for the creation of an alternative system of coding—a computational creole. 
Computational creole highlights the histories of radical black linguistic forms as a 
mode survival, as the language of colonial masters is reformulated with the aim of 
communicating with other captured people. As a multilingual system, computational creole 
demands, a looseness of syntax and grammar. It demands slippages, detours, and errantry. 
Furthermore, as a language through which racialized others communicate through machines, 
computational creole is a black digital linguistic system with the purpose of disrupting violent 
colonial algorithms. It is a new culture of programming that ascribes digital agency and 
subjecthood to black and migrant populations. Computational creole is a linguistic form of 
re-codification that does away with the colonial definition of blackness as criminality. 
Indeed, it is only within the refusal of the hegemonic system of capture that a dark-skinned 
black woman can create any utopian vision for herself. Computational creole, therefore, 
unlocks the possibilities of critically building tools with which black migrants can “dismantle 
the master’s house” (Lorde 2007: 112). 
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According to Chun (2008: 323), “digital media’s biggest impact on our lives is not 
through its interface, but through its algorithmic procedures.” Chun asserts that we must look 
beyond the interfaces and executions to the failures of the source code. We must search for 
the system of coding that “obfuscates the vicissitudes of execution” (Chun 2008: 300). This 
means we must examine our machines and deeply understand how they function—what 
underlying grammars do they follow?  
 
Conclusion 
In this paper, I have stressed that biometric technologies rely on a grammar of race 
that is written into their code. These grammars are rooted in the history of colonial capture 
and strict codifications within this system. It is for this reason that this paper leaves the 
definition of computational creole open—to invite experimentations and explorations that 
centre freedom from digital captivity or surveillance. As I have emphasized biometric capture 
depends on the colonization—the reorganisation of the lives of communities—using specific 
grammars and codes. In this article, I have argued that the grammars in the capturing of the 
Nigerian and black community in the UK dates from the colonial eras into the 1960s. I have 
stressed that in order to break from the machinic captivity of biometric capture, new 
languages of resistance must be created. These languages must be designed with 
technological failure in mind, as it is only when the hostile system of the biometric 
captivation of black migrants fails that we can truly be free. 
To argue that biometric technologies are simply neutral machines for the promotion 
of security and optimization of migration processes is to hide the legacy of colonial capture 
within them. It is to hide the violence they enforce in biometric borders. It is to hide the 
millions of migrants bound to the hostile biometric border. To argue that biometric 
technologies are apolitical objective tools is to ignore their discursive practices and to 
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undermine the radical possibilities of computational creole. What discourses are cited within 
the biometric capture room filled with black and brown bodies whose biological data will be 
used to subjugate them? What does it mean when black and African diasporic coders must 
compromise their identity for facial recognition? The more we deconstruct the discourses in 
computation and data capture, the more we uncover a system of colonial codes used to define 
and order black digital lives. This stresses the urgency for new systems—a demand for 
computational creole that disrupts the legacy code.  
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